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6
Wittgenstein and the
Conversation of Justice
Richard Eldridge

Political thinking has appeared in many different circumstances,
displayed many different styles, and argued for many different substantive
commitments. Despite these differences, however, it is possible to isolate
three broad traditions of style and substance within this thinking.

Political Theory, Political Science, and Political Judgment
Classical political theory, as in Plato's effort to describe the ideal state, seeks
to sketch the form of social life to which we rationally ought aspire, as of
fering us the necessary and perhaps even sufficient condition for the full re
alization of our rational humanity. The city of words that Socrates and his
interlocutors found is "a model laid up in heaven, for him who wishes to
look upon, and as he looks, set up the government of his soul. It makes no
difference whether it exists an)where or will exist." 1 One who gazes on this
model of political life and who then sets up the government of his soul ac
cordingly will "follow the wisdom-loving part" of the soul, with the result
that "there is no internal dissension .. . and each part [of the soul] will be
able to fulfill its own task and be just in other respects, and also each will
reap its own pleasures, the best and the tmest as far as possible." 2 This pic
ture of political theory and its relation to ethical life has significant appeal
and plausibility in broad outline. It seems hard to believe that we altogether
lack the capacities to imagine and to assess alternative futures and courses
of life for ourselves, and if we possess these capacities even in part, then why
not exercise them as best we can? The details of political theory and ethical
theory then arise out of the exercise of these capacities, as we seek in re
flection to take responsibility for who we are and what we do, both socially
and individually.
117
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Political science would have it otherwise. It is hopeless to try to deter
mine the conditions of the acquisition of the best and truest pleasures, be
cause we are not creatures who arc made to be content in doing whatever
reflective reasoning most fully recommends. Rather, we move on from de
sire to desire and from action to action, seeking security and the effective
power to fulfill our ever-arising desires within a framework of competition.
As Hobbes puts it,
the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For
there is no such Finis ultirnis (ultimate ayme,) nor Surmnum Bonum, (greatest
Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor can
a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and
Imagination are at a stand. Felicity is a continuall progresse of the desire,
from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the
way to the later. The cause whereof is, That the object of mans desire, is not
to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the
way of his future desire. 3
Since there is no ultimate aim and hence no perfect felicitv in fulfilling it,
the best anyone can do is to secure the effective power to satisfy ever-chang
ing desires. We are dominated by "a perpctuall and rcstlesse desire of Power
after power, that ccascth only in Death." Given the further "diversity of pas
sions, in divers men," given the need for "Riches, Honour, Command or
other power" in order to satisfy these passions, and given the scarcity of
these powers, it follows that human beings "enclineth to Contention, En
mity, and War: Because the way of one Competitor, to the attaining of his
desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repell the other." If this is the way
things are, then there is little point to imagining reflectively the conditions
of ideal felicity, for there are none. The best we can do is, first, to trace the
patterns and sources of persistent conflict and, second, to describe the
merely comparative advantages of obeying "a common Power" that might
afford human beings "protection from some other Power than their own." 1
What the sources and patterns of conflict: are, and how and why human be
ings as they stand might best manage their conflicts, independently of
empty reflections on any ultimate aim, are matters for empirical investiga
tion. Generalizations about what people are likely or liable to do in certain
circumstances arc ready enough to hand to support a descriptive science of
political life, that is, of the shape of the competition to satisfy desires under
given social conditions. It seems hard to believe that such generalizations
are either altogether unavailable or irrelevant. A descriptive science of what
people naturally tend to do seems to erase the possibility and importance of
deep normative reflection and to substitute pragmatic assessments of what
happens when certain natural tendencies are acted on under various condi
tions. Political science leaves no room for classical political theory.
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Interpretivism: Yet it also seems that not all political reasoning either is
or should be so immediately consequential. Sometimes, it seems,judges do
and ought to reason more imaginatively and less consequentially. Even if
they do not appeal deductively to comprehensive political or ethical norms,
they must sometimes issue verdicts about how the present conditions of po
litical compromise ought to be understood or might best be understood.
There is, as Ronald Dworkin notes, sometimes "theoretical disagreement in
law." That is, even where there is agreement "about what the statute books
and past judicial decisions have to say" about a certain class of problems/'
there can nonetheless be disagreement about whether or how a new case
falls within the relevant class. There may have been unambiguous good rea
sons provided by statute and precedent for deciding a set of past cases in a
certain way, but in the face of this new case the situation is unclear. Do the
past reasons for decision apply here, in a situation not explicitly addressed
by statute or precedent? In such cases, Dworkin argues, a judge will have to
determine what the law is, doing so interpretively andjudgmentally. Judges
should neither merely "enforce special legal conventions" nor act "as inde
pendent architects of the best future, free from the inhibiting demand that
they must act consistently in principle with one another." Rather their de
terminations of law should flow from "more refined and concrete interpre
tations of the same legal practice [ the law] has already begun to interpret."G
On Dworkin's model of the interpretive determination of the law, "proposi
tions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles ofjustice,
fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best constructive in
terpretation of the community's legal practice." In arriving at the best con
structive interpretation of legal practice, thejudge is to be neither a passive,
deferential historicist, insensitive to what the law implies but does not ex
plicitly state, nor a buccaneer activist substituting personal judgment on
questions of policy for that of the legislature. Judgment-flowing from the
interpretation of legal practice, and expressing how we are in that practice
"united in community though divided in project, interest, and convic
tion"-is crucial.7 Here the exercise of judgment involves something like
Aristotelian phronesis updated in Hegelian fashion by including a commit
ment to democratic community. Neither ideal models of the political good
nor consequential assessments of the effects of various regimes, but rather
interpretive judgment, expressive of and on behalf of the ways of a demo
cratic political community, is to determine what the law is.
Dworkin's model of the interpretive determination of the law is subtle,
and it seems to offer a way between the sometimes heavy-handed and po
tentially tyrannical appeals to ideal models of social and personal life that
are distinctive of the classical tradition in political theory and the conse
quential assessments that express no aspiration to common rational citi
zenship and social reciprocity that are distinctive of the post-Hobbesian tra
dition of political science. But is this model coherent and tenable? Just what
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do Dworkin's judges do, and how do they do it? For all his talk of the ideal
judge as an interpreter "sensitive to the great complexity of political
virtues" and embracing "popular conviction and national tradition when
ever these are pertinent," 8 it remains at least unclear what room there is be
tween appeal to ideal models and consequential assessment of effects. Sup
pose judges try to express the value commitments of their community to
justice, fairness, and procedural due process in a genuinely new case that is
not unambiguously settled by statute or precedent. What do they do? Do
they say what these values in fact require in a present case, that is, what
people really ought to believe about how best to fulfill these values? Or do
they consult the actual preferences that people have about how to go on?
Either, it seems, the judge must act from claims about values themselves,
where these claims may to an outsider appear as the whims of tyranny, or
the judge must act from the verdicts of empirical research into the felt con
sequences of political and legal arrangements. The judge must be either an
active thinker, guided by political theory or whim (depending on one's own
view of the judge's values), or a passive respecter of the empirical results
(of, say, market behavior theory) about how conflict might be minimized
and decent chances at satisfaction maintained. How is it possible at the
same time to be both an active thinker, drawing on ideals, and a passive de
ferrer to strict precedents and empirical results? Is the interpretivist picture
of an ideal judge coherent?
There is quite likely no straightforward answer to these questions inde
pendently of close critical readings of what judges and other political actors
have done and might do in furthering the ways of a democratic political
community. Dworkin himself discusses in detail both the complex values
that have informed democratic political practice and how judges either
have addressed or might address in hard cases the question of how best to
further those values in a particular present. The chief point of Dworkin's
emphases on interpretation and judgment is that there is no "algorithm for
the courtroom" or for the legislative assembly: 9 to see what might best be
done in any particular case will require a reflective survey of what has been
done in past cases coupled with intimate normative assessments of how best
to go on now. Still, how does one know how to go on?

Wittgenstein on Judgment
"A philosophical problem," Wittgenstein writes in Philosophical Investiga
tions, "has the form: 'I don't know my way about' " (PI § 123). Throughout
Philosophical Investigations, the condition of the human subject in attempt
ing to come to judgment, both as a self-responsible agent and in relation to
ongoing linguistic practice, is continually reenacted. lO The protagonist of
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Philosophical Investigations carries on an internal dialogue with himself, in
which he seeks to make judgments in accordance with both rationally well
founded standards for correctness and the more flexible ways of common
practice. This internal dialogue is broken off, rather than concluded in a
final discovery of how we are to judge, so that, insofar as we identify with
the voices of this internal dialogue, we are cast as subjects for whom judg
ment is always a problem, involving the claiming of responsibility, and
never something properly determined by a method.Hence this internal di
alogue in Philosophical Investigations offers us-to the extent that we might
identify with its voices-a chance to recognize in a new way what we do and
might do in judging, in politics as in other domains.
One prominent thought in this internal dialogue is that in attempting to
apply our words, we should attend patiently to ordinary uses of language,
rather than trying to discover philosophical supcrfacts (for example, about
forms or essences) that are properly legislative for ordinary practice. For
example, "What does it mean to know what a game is? ... Isn't my knowl
edge, my concept of a game, completely expressed in the explanations that
I could give? That is, in my describing examples of various kinds of game;
shewing how all sorts of other games can be constructed on the analogy of
these; saying that I should scarcely include this or this among games; and so
on" (Pl§ 75).
Here knowing what a game is does not imply knowing an explicitly for
mulated definition, vouchsafed by philosophical investigation into
essences, but rather simply being able to apply the word "game" to various
sorts of ordinary cases. "One gives examples and intends them to be taken
in a particular way.-I do not, however, mean by this that he is supposed to
see in those examples that common thing which I-for some reason-was
unable to express; but that he is now to employ those examples in a particu
lar way. Herc giving examples is not an indirect means of explaining-in de
fault of a better" (PI§ 71).
One's knowledge of a concept or of the application of a word is expressed
in ordinary practice, in doing what is done: "there is a way of grasping a rule
which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call 'obeying
the rule' and 'going against it' in actual cases" (Pl§ 201). If this is so, then
the best we can do is to stop hunting about for justifications of linguistic
and conceptual practice, ordinary or otherwise, and instead clear up "mis
understandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things,
by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of
language" (PI§ 90). It is in ongoing ordinary practice alone that criteria of
correctness arc laid down; there is no point or possibility of assessing, ex
plaining, or justifying that practice. "Philosophy may in no way interfere
with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it" (Pl
§ 124).

122

Richard Eldridge

This line of thinking may well appear to be of little help when we are ac
tually faced with hard cases of judgment. In politics, it looks like an en
dorsement of conservatism or traditionalism, and the impression that
Wittgenstein is somehow conservative or traditionalist, especially in politics,
is not uncommon.But this line of thinking about judgment in Philosophical
Investigations is not the end of the storv. There is a second line of thinking
according to which it is not so easy always to rest in doing what is ordinarily
done. "You will find it difficult," we are reminded, or Wittgenstein reminds
himself, "to hit upon ...a convention [for the exact use of a word]; at least
any that satisfies you" (Pl § 88). While this remark reminds us to attend to
varieties of actual use rather than to seek any explicit definition of at least
some concept words, it also suggests that the convention to do whatever is
done in using a word is not satisfying either. One can "adduce only exterior
facts about language" (PI§ 120), rather tlian explaining or justifying ordi
nary usages.This in turn means that those usages seem to hover in the air.
They come from us, or from our engagements with the world.Surely there
are questions to be asked about how they arise and about how they might
best be continued, especially in relation to hard cases. If these questions
turn out to be unanswerable, then that leaves us disappointed with ordi
nary usage as it stands, leaves us wanting either a normative theory of what
we ought to say or an empirical account of how many people are naturally
caused to say what they say.This want or wish goes unappeased by the sim
ple recommendation to attend to what we say.This difficulty is insisted on
in Philosophical Investigations itself. "We arc therefore as it were entangled in
our own rules. This entanglement in our rules is what we want to under
stand (i.e.get a clear view of)" (PI§ 125). Our wanting to understand does
not lapse in the face of the varieties of ordinary practice that we encounter,
but is rather nourished by them. Hence, despite the fact that it is fruitless,
we do "predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing it" (Pl
§ 104).We seek to find in the thing some essence that requires us to judge it to
be what it is, rather than resting content with the thought that criteria for
judgment arc only laid down in ongoing practices.We seek either a norma
tive theory of what we ought to do or a causal explanation of what we in fact
do in using language. It is not so easy-as the continuing self-interroga
tions, the continuing swerves by the protagonist into and back out of phi
losophy show-to stop doing philosophy. There is nothing, these swerves
suggest, deeper than ordinary practice that is available to guide it, and yet
that practice does not run smoothly for us on its own: we want more.
No one has been more continuously and closely attentive to these op
posed lines of thinking about ordinary practice in the text of Philosophical
Investigations than Stanley Cavell. One way of characterizing Wittgenstein's
efforts that Cavell has offered is that Wittgenstein "undertook to trace ...
the ways in which, in investigating ourselves, we are l,ed to speak 'outside
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language games,' consider expressions apart from, and in opposition to,
the natural forms of life which give those expressions the force they have." 11
What Cavell has in mind here-in speaking of how, according to Wittgen
stein, we are led to speak outside the ordinary-is the philosophical search,
in thinking about our prospects (political and otherwise), for standing
terms or principles that are decisively authoritative in setting norms for our
practice. People ordinarily do all sorts of different things. In philosophy
one is tempted to try to discern what they all rationally ought to do, no mat
ter what.Perhaps one's succumbing to this temptation is motivated by a fear
of the unruliness and unintelligibility of the muddle of ordinary practice as
it stands; perhaps it is motivated by a wish that one should oneself possess
perfect authority; perhaps it is motivated by a sense of the pains and diffi
culties of bearing responsibility within ordinary practice, where the norma
tive principles of correctness are unarticulated or unclear and hence where
challenges to what one does are always possible.In any case, succumbing to
this temptation and thinking philosophically about what all rational crea
tures ought to do is natural enough, even human, all too human.We are led
to speak "outside language games."
What then in turn mostly happens, however, is that this effort misfires.
Seeking to think, judge, and speak with perfect authority, somehow in
touch with absolute norms, "we lose ... a full realization of what we are say
ing; we no longer know what we mean." 12 That is, rather than speaking
within the terms of ordinary practice-conversationally or dialectically,
one might say-where challenges arc always possible, we instead seek to
speak as more than a finite and situated subject. Hence we come to speak
inhumanly, as we refuse the role of an ordinary speaker in relation to an or
dinary interlocutor. Nothing, again, is more natural than to be tempted to
do this. But when we do it, we lose a sense of ourselves as finite subjects in
conversational and other practical relations to other finite subjects. The
only cure for this loss is to return to ways of ordinary thought and inter
locution, with all their unclarities, imperfections, and pains. But to do this
is to return to the very scene in which the temptations and wishes to speak
otherwise, to speak absolutely, arose.
Hence there is in us, in Cavell's reading, something that is expressed and
exemplified within the continuing drama of Philosophical Investigations:
"[an] irreconcilability ...between our dissatisfaction with the ordinary and
our satisfaction in it, between speaking outside and inside language games,
which is to say, the irreconcilability of the two voices (at least two) in the In
vestigations, the writer with his other, the interlocutor, the fact that poses a
great task, the continuous task of Wittgenstein's prose, oscillating between
vanity and humility." 13
Read in the light of this sense of the irreconcilability for us of our dissat
isfaction with the ordinary and our satisfaction in it, both intellectualist ide-
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alism and empiricist naturalism appear as misbegotten efforts-albeit in
evitable ones-to close or foreclose this irreconcilability. Intellectualist ide
alism, of which classical political theory is an instance, offers us the form of
the good, the essence of the just state, the aim of human life, intellectually
grasped and thence to be realized in practice guided by that grasp; all that
remains is administration.'The Form of the Good ...must be reckoned to
be for all the cause of all that is right and beautiful, ...and he who is to act
intelligently in public or in private must see it." 14 The trouble with this pro
posal is that it removes us from our role as finite human speakers always
working out with others critically the terms of going on with our lives, and
in doing so it makes us (all too humanly) inhuman. Empiricist naturalism,
maintaining contact with what is ordinarily done, offers us results about
how most effectively to satisfy preferences as they stand-about how to man
age conflict or distribute scarce resources efficiently, blocking no trades.
The trouble with this proposal is that it scants our powers for reflecting and
for desiring otherwise, more deeply and humanly than one once did, say, as
a child.
The advice of Philosophical Investigations, as Cavell reads it, is then to "see
how philosophical explanations [intellectualist and empiricist alike] will
seek to distract you from your interests (ordinary, scientific, aesthetic); how
they counterfeit necessity. That this advice is all but impossible to take is
Wittgenstein's subject." 15 In an odd way, the truth of this situation-that we
remain caught up in that irreconcilability, both able to reflect and act be
yond the ordinary or departing from it, but never to do so perfectly and
alone-is expressed better by the skeptic than by either the intellectualist
idealist or the empiricist naturalist. The skeptic at least sees that there is
something wrong, that we live in a condition in which we continue to wish
for something that continually does not come true."The threat or truth of
skepticism [is] that it names our wish (and the possibility of our wishing) to
strip ourselves of the responsibility we have in meaning (or in failing to
mean) one thing, or one way, rather than another." 16
How are we then, humanly, to live with this wish, no longer entranced by
counterfeit necessities? Cavell's suggestion is that we do live with it, both as
individuals and as communities of interrelated subjects, by swerving back
and forth between moments of acceptance of the ordinary and moments of
criticism of it.Cavell's own name for this ongoing process of swerving is the
argument of the ordinary: the argument of the ordinary with itself over its pos
sible perfection, carried on in and through us. "The human capacity-and
the drive-both to affirm and to deny our criteria constitute the argument
of the ordinary."17
Living out this capacity and drive involves a double movement. Some
times there are times "to be the one who goes first." 18 The present condi
tions-that is, present practices and the criteria in use there-have grown
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repressive, stultifying, or conformist. It is time to mark out a new path, to
think and thence to propose new criteria. The risks of such a path are isola
tion and madness, failing to speak as a genuinely human subject at all.
Hence there are also times to wait, to find one's voice only in its engage
ment with what is ordinarily said and thought and done. To go on in
thought alone and against the sways of the ordinary is to risk unintelligibil
ity; to remain within those sways is to risk human nonexistence by falling
into thoughtless conformity.
To move between and within these risks is to participate in the argument
of the ordinary. This participation involves seeking further intelligibility
both of oneself to oneself and of the community to itself. Cultivation or per
fection is the ongoing aim of this participation, as one seeks both actively and
independently to think andjudge and also to think andjudge cooperatively, in
reciprocity and acknowledgment with others who actively think and judge
likewise. To do all this is further to take part in the conversation ofjustice:
Perfectionism's emphasis on culture or cultivation ... is to be understood in
connection with this search for intelligibility [to oneself], or say this search
for direction in what seems a scene of moral chaos, the scene of the dark
place in which one has lost one's way. Here also the importance to perfec
tionism of the friend, the figure, let us say, whose conviction in one's moral
intelligibility draws one to discover it, to find words and deeds in which to ex
press it, in which to enter the conversation of justice.19
Where, at last, does this picture of our plight as subjects leave political the
ory, political science, and political judgment? In one way, interpretivist po
litical judgment seems to be the best form of thinking about politics, the
form most faithful to our ongoing engagements in the argument of the or
dinary and the conversation of justice. The best we can do, it seems, is to
demonstrate interpretively and narratively how our practices have ex
pressed our most important political commitments in the past and how they
might be continued or recast so as best to further their expression at pre
sent,just as Dworkin suggests.
Yet this result faces two related difficulties. It has, first of all, too much
the air of a triumphant metaperspective. "At last," it proclaims, "we know
what we're doing when we're thinking well politically; we're thinking narra
tively and interpretively." As perhaps with most metaperspectives, this one
seems not to offer us much help in coping with any particular present prob
lem of political practice. Instead of engaging in the conversation ofjustice
(as he does elsewhere), Dworkin as a theorist offers us more an illusion of
method (and its securities) than anything that actually generates a result.
Here the interpretivist metaperspective seems to encourage distance
from both the practices to be attended to and from full engagement in any
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practice ofclose interpretation. It's all just another interpretation,another
story, whatever one does. This thought forecloses the agon ofseeking intel
ligibility to oneself in and through one's conversations with others about
how one's culture might best be perfected toward becoming a fit home for
human agency.It is not so easy to escape this agon into the thought that any
thing one says will be an interpretation,and if one does so escape then one
is no longer quite in the conversation. In contrast to any stance ofdetach
ment, Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations presents himself not as a
master of either interpretations or interpretive strategies, but rather as
caught up in the contending claims that are made on him by various ac
counts ofjudgment.Likewise,Cavell engages densely with specific literary
and philosophical texts, in doing so bearing a sense that he is letting him
self be read by them. Not only must we generate interpretations and claim
to have reasons,we must also be open to the claims made on us by texts and
their reasons.
¥lhat is "consideration " in the theory of contract in this hard case, or
what is "the best interest of the child" in contemporary family law? These
are substantive,arguable questions.Disagreements about answers to them
arise out of,and are woven into,disagreements in ways oflife. To say,in re
sponse to these questions,"Construct the best interpretation you can ofthe
meanings of these phrases that are latent in our practice," is to step aside
from the substantive debate, not to enter it. Entering the debate is insepa
rable from living argumentatively within its terms, in one contending way
rather than another.As Pierre Bourdieu notes, "the art ofapplying knowl
edge, and applying it aptly in practice ...is inseparable from an overall
manner of acting, or living, inseparable from a habitus." 20 Dworkin's
methodology seeks to rise above the entanglements that come with living
within contending habituses,and it fails.
Second, the interpretivist metaperspective and the injunction always to
tell the best story one can about past and prospective practice misses the
fact that both theoretical idealizations and empirical results will figure
within any good story. This is the obverse ofthe first difficulty: urged alone,
interpretivism is too empty and abstractly distancing; actually done
closely-it now appears-it is continuous with both ideal theory and empir
ical inquiry. In attempting interpretively to develop and exercise political
judgment it will sometimes be important to articulate intellectually a new
ideal ( or a new version ofan ideal) ofhow we might best arrange our com
mon life; it will sometimes be important to be the one who goes first to de
nounce present injustice and to point the way forward. Religiously moti
vated abolitionists, say, in the grip of an ideal of comprehensive human
reciprocity, are examples offigures who,by forcing imaginative confronta
tion with the facts of slavery, went first. Sometimes it will be important to
change past practice radically.
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But it will also sometimes be important to carry out and take seriously
straightforward empirical investigations into what human beings actually
do care about most deeply; it will sometimes be important to take seriously
the ways of the ordinary. Empirical inquirers who have reminded us that
most people care to have a modicum of private life to pursue happiness as
they see fit, or that people typically seek advantages for their children about
whom they care deeply, arc good examples of those who have rightly chas
tened utopian would-be engineers of human souls who have supposed we
might follow an ideal of universal comradeship, say. Sometimes it will be
important to remind ourselves of what we mostly just do prefer in our social
arrangements.
Judging in accordance with the reminder that we are always to construct
the best interpretation we can of what we have been and might be seems to
miss the force of the more committed political insights that stem from both
ideal political theory and empirical political science. Each of the three
styles of political thinking-political theory, political science, and political
judgment-depends on the others for appropriate correction of its own
partialities of insight. Each of them figures rightly in certain moments of
the argument of the ordinary and of the conversation of justice. Cavell re
marks that he thinks of "philosophy as the achievement of the unpolemical,
of the refusal to take sides in metaphysical positions." 21 That this is an
achievement-the refusing of counterfeit necessities in favor of the accep
tance of thinking and listening as a human subject in relation to human
subjects-albeit one that it is almost impossible for us to manage, is some
thing we might learn from Wittgenstein's voices.
What follows, then, from the condition of the human person that is en
acted in Philosophical Investigations is, I think, a kind of substantive or weak
perfectionist liberalism in the style ofJoseph Raz, 22 as opposed to the neu
tralist, proceduralist, rights-oriented liberalism of Dworkin. Political proce
duralism in general faces the following dilemma. Either the procedures
urged for resolving disputes and establishing sociopolitical arrangements
are sharply specified: in that case they will reasonably appear to some to be
tyrannical in forwarding an uncongenial way of life; or the procedures
urged will be fully neutral among contending ways of life, but empty, both
incapable of yielding resolutions and incapable of commanding allegiance
from within a way of life.23 Here the fate of putatively necessary political
procedures parallels the fates of the necessary explanations of thought and
language that are traced in Philosophical Investigations; such necessary expla
nations haunt and tempt us but never quite coherently engage wholly with
the ordinary.
The way out of proceduralism and toward substantive liberalism is then
to see different ways of life as reasonably contending ways of embodying the
good. These ways of life are in genuine contention with one another. It is
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not easy for the Amish fully to see the value of the life of those living within
consumer society and vice versa. Affirmative tolerance and talking will
often be in order, 24 including feeling in oneself measures of both resistance
and attraction to what is other. So will waiting: sometimes there will be
nothing to say, though nonetheless the hope of reciprocity and social per
fection does not lapse. So will a political framework of mutual respect:
hence the liberalism. But this framework will express a commitment to a
substantive good-personal autonomy; 2 " it will not of itself neutrally settle
conflicts about the scope and value of this good. No political decision pro
cedure will. But then human life is complicated and interesting, in it'> en
tanglement in the conversation ofjustice. 26
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